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Summary findings
The peak of the first global real estate boom was reached  that triggered this new phenomenon of global real estate
around  1990 in most OECD countries. Asset inflation  volatility. His intent: Assuming that the globalization of
was massive: in office markets across Europe, capital  financial markets is irreversible, can we separate unique
values rose 400 percent between 1980 and 1990,  factors from recurring ones in this first global cycle? Can
accelerating after 1986 - while average consumer price  we map generic policy lessons and identify policy
inflation went up only 150 percent. Property values have  priorities and research agendas? Can we identify factors
declined sharply since 1990, with most property markets  that accentuate real estate price and investment
losing at least 20 percent in nominal terms the first year  volatility?
of the crash's onset. Cumulative drops in capital value  Four domestic factors lay behind the unusual volatility
often reached 50 percent by the end of 1993.  of this first global cycle, says Renaud: the liberalization
This pattern  of a sustained buildup, usually peaking in  and deregulation of capital markets, a distorted incentive
1990, followed by a sharp fall in nominal values, has  structure that often stimulated the use of debt, new
been encountered in most OECD markets and in several  macroeconomic tools and occasional policy errors, and
NIE countries.  the structure of the real estate sector itself.
Real estate booms and busts are recurring events, says  The wide-ranging survey includes a proposal for
Renaud, but real estate volatility on the scale and with  research in certain areas, and offers some diagnosis. For
the intensity just experienced is costly and destructive.  example: If the global real estate crash has publicized one
Real resources are misallocated, and the impact on the  thing, it is the poor quality of information on real estate
banking system, on households, and on the economy can  markets.
be lasting.
Renaud surveys the global real estate cycle of 1985-
94, trying to identify domestic and international factors
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THE 1985-1994  GLOBAL REAL ESTATE  CYCLE:
ITS CAUSES  AND CONSEQUENCES.
" II y a quelque  chose  de commum  entre  l'art du puzzle et l'art du go; seules  les pieces  rassemblees
prendront in caractere  lisible,  prendront  un sens: consideree  isolement  une piece d'un puzzle ne veut rien
dire, elle est seulement  question  impossible,  defi opaque..."
(Georges  Perec,  La vie mode  d 'emploi) 1
1.  THE GLOBAL REAL ESTATE  CRASH,  A NEW  PHENOMENON
The rapid emergence  of a global  financial  system  durng the late 1980s  has been signaled  in the
real estate sector of most OECD industrial  countries -and  NIE middle-income  countries as well-by
coincident  cycles  with  unusually  strong  booms followed  by exceptionally  sharp  and protracted  real estate
busts. The peak of the boom was reached  in 1990  in most OECD  countries. The massive  asset inflation
which tool place can be illustrated  by the performance  of office markets  acrtss Europe as monitored  by
the Jones-Lang-Wootton  European Property Index.  Figure I  shows that capital values rose 400%
between 1980  and 1990 with an acceleration  after 1986. During that period, average consumer  price
inflation went up only 150%.  Since 1990,  the decline  in property values has  been sharper,  most property
markets  losing at least 20% in nominal  terms the first  year of the onset of the crash. Cumulative  falls in
capital value have  often  reached 50% by the end of 1993. This  pattern of a long sustained  buildup in
real estate asset prices  usually  peaking in 1990 followed graphically  by a very sharp fall in nominal
values thereafter has been encountered  in most OECD  markets  and in several  NIE countries.  2
Real estate booms and busts are recurring events. However,  real estate volatility on the scale
and intensity  just experienced  is costly and destructive. Real resources  are misallocated, the impact on
the barldng system can be lasting and reach far beyond the real estate sector itself. The widespread
appearance  of negative  housing  equity  can have a catastrophic  impact  on large  numbers  of households.  In
addition to their unusual intensity,  the coincidence  of  so many real'  estate crashes on a global scale is
also a new event. The effects of this global crash on the real estate industry,  the financial system, the
household  sector  and the overall  economy  are still  being felt in most countries  today.
I  "There is something  in common  between  the art of  puzzle assembly  and the game of go. Only
when the pieces are fitted together do they acquire a legible caracter, gain a meaning.  Examined in
isolation a piece of a puzzle means nothing; it is just an impossible  question, an opaque challenge".
Georges  Perec, Life, A  User's ManuaL
2 'Me JLW office index is  weighted  by market size and compiled  across 14 of the largest metropolitan
markets in Europe. Price  pattems similar  to Europe's real estate cycle are fbund in East and South  East
Asian countries  like Taiwan  (Taipei),  Hong-Kong,  Korea  (Seoul), Thailand  (Bangkok),  Malaysia  (Kuala
Lumpur).The 1985-1994  Global Real Estate Cycle. Page 2
Figure 1: The European Office Property Boom
European  Property  Index  for Offices (1980=100)
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Source:  Jones Lang Wootton  International.
From an analytical  perspective,  the global  crash presents unusual research  opportunities. More
importantly,  from a policy  viewpoint,  we need to understand  much better how national and local market
experiences  differ to avoid other episodes  of  synchronous  and  extreme volatility. What has triggered
this global cycle? Why is its volatility so much greater  in some countries  than others. The phenomenon
hlas  been global, yet knowledge  about it is usually  lirnited  to one's own country,  or remains fragmentary.
Feor  instance,  the causes and consequences  of  regional and local boomns  and busts in the US during the
1980  has been studied  with  a fair amnount  of thoroughness.  The existence  of a Japanese  asset "bubble"  has
.also  been debated at some length. But the links between Japanese domestic  asset inflation experience
and the spread of the global  boom should also be spelled out.  Also,  why have some groups  of countries
like the Nordic Countries - especially Finland - been  hit so severely  hits when other countries like
Germany  appeared rernarkably  immune  to the drama  unfolding  almost everywhere  else?
This  paper presents an exploratory  survey  of the global  real estate cycle of 19P,5-1994.3  Prior to
engaging  in detailed quantitative  analyses  of the shape of individual  cycles,  for countries,  cities and
individual  markets,  it aims is to identify  more clearly  the international  and domestic  factors  that triggered
this new phenomenon  of global  real estate  volatility. The intent is threefold. First, taking  as a given that
the globalization  of financial  mnarkets  is most  pm,bably  an irreversible  process, can we separate  unique
factors from recurring  ones in this first  global  cycle? Second, is it possible  to map the generic  policy
lessons  and, by implication,  identify more  clearly  policy  priorities and research  agendas?  Can  we identify
more clearly  the international  and domestic  faators  at work  which accentuate real estate  price and
investment  volatility? Third, probing  into the unappealing  trilogy of "bad luck,  bad policy, and bad
3  selecion of the years which bracket this first global cycle are partly a reporting convenience  since
the national real estate cycles surveyed  have not been perfectly synchlronous.  1985  is the year of the G-5
Plaza agreement on currency  realignment  with implementation  beginning in February 1996.  The 1987
L,ouvre G-7 meeting agreed that new exchange  levels were adequate and focused on the coordinated
macroeconomic  stimulation  of the G-3 economies,  particularly JapaI(See  Volker-GyohIten  [19921  pp.
274-S and 3S7-9].  1994  usually mars  the bottoming  out of the real estate secor in most countries.The 1985-1994  Global Real Estate Cycle. Page 3
banking"  what are the lasting  analytical,  institutional  and regulatory  lessons  which can we can draw?
What would  individual  countries  need  to do reduce the volatility of their real estate sector  under the
conditions  created  by the new global  financial  markets? Can useful  lessons  be drawn  for countries  that
are not yet fully integrated  into the global  capital  markets  such the semi-reformed  socialist  economies,
and developing  countries.
We begin with the analysis of the international  factors at work and review the evidence on
Japanese  net capital  outflows  after 1985  as the major  reason  behind all these synchronous  national cycles.
Then we consider  the domestic  factors  that have encouraged  real estate volatility  such as capital market
liberalization,  financial deregulation,  pre-existing  tax structures, distorting fiscal policies, as  policy
errors. The differentiated  impact of the real estate crash, the various ways-  different  countries chose to
handle it,  and some the innovations  that are emerging  from the rubble complete  this survey.
The work is based on a data collection  covering  Japan, the US, the UK, the Nordic countries,
France, Gentany, Spain,  as well as selected  middle-income  countries  of East Asia, South-East  Asia, and
Latin America. Only selective  evidence  is presented  in this paper.
II. INTERNATIONAL  FACTORS  IN  THE 1985-1994  CYCLE
2.1  A Dominant  Global  Factor:  Japanese  Foreign  Investment
The coincident  real estate cycles encountered  in most - but not all -OECD countries  and many
middle-income  developing  countries  during  the period 1986-to 1993  were responses  to a combination  of
external and domestic causes. In the past, surges  of capital inflows  into different  parts of the real estate
sector of these countries  have differed  in terms of timing,  persistence,  and intensity. The major  fiancial
deregulation  and decontrol  of capital flows that took place during the 1980's have certainly  made the
global real estate cycle possible. However,  they do not explain its origin. A central  feature  behind the
global cycle - i.e. so many synchronous  national cycles  - has been the massive Japanese  dominance  of
world financial  markets during  the period. To quote one of the best analyses  of the powerful  Japanese
asset price cycle and the associated  net long-term  capital outflows:
"Japan's share of net long-term  capital outflows  among the G-7 countries  plus traditional capital
exporters  Denmark,  the Netherlands,  Switzerland  and Saudi Arabia  rose from a quarter in 1982
to nearly 90% in 1987.  In 1989, more than half of all foreign direct investment in these
countries came from Japan. By that time, Japan had become the biggest  net creditor nation on
record, easily surpassing  previous US or OPEC surpluses  at their peak.  I...]  This historical
expansion  of Japanese  capital exports  was, however,  followed  by an historical  collapse:  virtually
within the short  period of one quarter, Japan  became a sizable  net importer  of long-term capital
in 1991."  (Richard  A. Wemer. [1994]).The 1985-1994  Global Real Estate Cycle. Page 4
Figure  2.  Japan:  Balance  of Payments  and  Net Capital  Outflows,  1970-1993
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This rnassive surge of  Japanese net  capital exports raises four basic questions:  what  triggered
this tidal wave, or more appropriately this tsunami?  What domestic institutional  arrangements made the
generation of  this capital possible? How was it exported?  Why did the flow stop so abruptly?
2.2  The 1985 Plaza  Accord as Trigger of the Japanese Asset Boom
The massive Japanese international capital flows were  directly linked to the  "land bubbie"  and
the interactions between very rapidly appreciating land values, ap-oreciating equity prices and easy credit
by the  banking sector.  'Me trigger that lead to the accelcration  in land valucs  has been the  G-5 Plaza
Accord of  Septernber  1985.  That accord  led to the  major  currency realignment  across  G-5 countries,
particularly  the Dollar-Yen exchange rates.  This currency realigmnment  was accornipanied by negotiations
on a  coordinated  stimulus package  and the  stabilization of  exchange rates  (Louvre  Agreement) which
included in the case of Japan a lowering of the cenftral bank discoimt r-ate first to 3.00 and soon to a then
historical  low of  2.5%.4 Banlc loans as well as bank loans from non-bank financial  insfitutions to real
estate companies.  From a stable  shar  of about 7% of total bank loans for two decades, such real estate
4  Such a stimulus  package was at first stongly  resisted  by Japanese  financial authorities  because
the  national  goverrnment deficit  had  reached  almost  22  percent  of  the  budget  by  1985,  and  total
outstanding public debt was equivalent to 42 percent  of GNP and growing.  Earlier in  1984, work by the
Regan-Takeshita committee lad  the basis for the rapid emergence of the Euroyen market.  (For details on
internaadonal fuinance coordination  during  the  1980's,  see  Volker  and  Gyohten  119921 pp.  248-280,
especially pp.  274-75).  At the beginning  of the boom,  in  1986, the  Bank of Japan discount  rate had
fallcn to a first  historical low point of 2.5 percent  In 1993, following three consecutive years of  brutal
real estate and  eqtuities price  deflation, Japan experienced  a  new historical  low in the  discount rate  at
1.75%. The Bank  of Japan's  new discount rate  of  1.75%  aimed  to remedy  the rnassive credit  crunch
caused by the severe deterioration of the balance-sheets of Japan's  banking sector.The 1985-1994  Global Real Estate Cycle. Page 5
lending activities climbed sharply after 1985 to 17% in 1990. (see Figure 3, Yoshino [1991], Werner
[19941).  Land  wealth as a share of net worth  shot  up from  55% to over 70% between  1985  and 1988,  as a
share of GNP it rose from 2.8 to 5 times during  the same  period. This land price dynamics  in Japan has
been abundantly  reviewed internationally  in various papers (see for instance,  Noguchi, 1990 and  Stone
and Ziemba, 1993).
2.3  Domestic Asset Price Inflation in Japan: Land and Equities
The combination  of low  interest  rates and abundant  liquidity favored  real estate investments,  and
impacted  most sharply on the inelastic  in  ban land supply  to generate  accelerating  land price appreciation.
The institutional  anrangements  in Japan  through which  rapidly rising land values can lead to other  forms
of asset appreciation  are by now well understood. (See  for instance, Ito [1992],  Chapter l4). Increases  in
the price of land price held by corporations  means a rise in the value of this asset on the their balance-
sheet.  Unrealized  capital  gains lead in turn to both increases  in Tobin's q, the ratio of market  value to
corporate  asset value, and easier access  to bank loans which may be used for new productive  investment
or more speculative  real estate  investments.  5
Real estate sector  rigidities combined  with relaxed  macroeconomic  policies have amplified  land
price volatility.  The inelasticity of urban land supply associated with  complex urban development
regulations  is accentuated  in Japan by land  use regulations  which restrict  rural-urban  land use conversion.
Land price volatility is also fueled  by fiscal arrangements  that encourage  land hoarding [Kirwan, 1987],
[Mera, 19921,  [Case, 1992].  These distorting regulatory and fiscal arrangements are: the land and
building leases laws, low property taxation, the privileged treatment of farm land in cities, the very
favorable  treatment  of capital gains treatment  on real estate  property which triggers lock-in effects, and
bequest taxes which give favorable  treatment  to real estate over other assets.  [Noguchi, 1990].  The
impact of rising land prices on  other assets, especially high equity price-earnings ratios has been
amplified by cross-holding  because  in Japan about 40-50  percent of all outstanding  shares of stocks are
held by other  corporations,  and banks. 6 [Ito, 1992]
There  was a massive  rise in Japanese  stock  price-earning  ratios from 20 in 1984  to 60 in 1990.
6  Ito 119921  uses the concept of  the "required  rate of return" on holding assets such as bonds,
equities  and land to link high price-earning  ratios on the Japanese land market  and on the stock market.
Japanese  land prices are extremely high by international  standards,  but rents are comparable  with other
metropolitan  centers  such as London (Noguchi,  1990). For a given expected  total return r for all assets,
if L, is the price of land and its rent r, the arbitrage  condition  between  land and these other assets  is: r =
Ir,  + (L,  +1-LI/  L,  or r  = r,/L, +(L  + 1 -L/L,.  A low  earnings/price  ratio is then expected  tq be
compensated  by a high rate of capital appreciation.The 1985-1994  Global Real Estate Cycle. Page 6
Figure 3. Japan: Changing Composition  of Bank Lending and Land Inflation
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2.4  Land Price  Inflation  and Japanese  Net Long-Term  Capital  Flows
How could high  and rising land  prices possibly  affect Japanese  international  capital flows? After
all, foreigners  have been playing  a very marginal  role in the Japanese  property market. If an owner  sells
his highly  appreciated  property,  and as long  the buyer is also Japanese,  the macroeconomic  impact on the
rest of the world  should  be zero. The existence  of a link between the explosive  fluctuations  in real estate
asset prices and Japanese  net long-term capital flows has been successfully  established empirically  by
Werner [1994]. Traditional  models of capital flows are based on national accounting  identities; they
lead to the automatic  conclusion  that net capital outflows  are equal  to the current  account surplus.  In fact
net capital outflows  were larger than the current account surplus in Japan during the global real estate
boom (see Figure  2). The basic  national accounting  identity  is:
(X-M) = (S-I) + (T-G) = - F
The current account surplus (X-M)  is equal to the sum of net private investment (S-I) plus the public
sector deficit or surplus (T-G);  it is also equal to net capital qutflows  which are recorded as a negative
value in international finance statistics.  It is the behavior of each term of these identities that needs
explanation. How did Japan  borrow its way into such epxlosive  gorwth in overseas  investment?  Werner
has shown  that real estate asset appreciation  has played the critical  role in Japanese  net capital outflows.
He demonstrates  this link by shifting  to a theoretically  more sound behavioral  macroeconomic  portfolio
model  of international  capital flows,  in which  he introduces  land-related  loans. 7 He finds that the rate of
change on the volume of real estate related loans has a statistcally significant effect in explaining  net
capital outflows  (see Figure  4).  Werner's  finding  is that  "through  its interaction  with the banking system,
Japan's "land bubble" appears  to have been a major  factor contributing  to the movement  of Japanese  net
long-term  capital flows"  (Wemer [1994],  p. 175).
There have been two links between land inflation and bank credit in the Japanese financial
environment First,  banks made land-related  loans directly  to real-estate companies  or indirectly  through
loans to the non-bank financial institutions  which are in Japan the main loan channels  to real estate
companies.  Such lending  rose very sharply  and, as just noted, fueled  a joint land and equities asset price
inflation.  Second, Japanese  bank have traditionally  relied on real estate collateral  rather than project
quality and cash flow to make loans.  After 1985, the soaring value of land has provided the collateal
against  which Japanese  firms could borrow  at home to buy assets  abroad.  Much  of this investment  was
portfolio investments  (US bonds and other securities),  yet a very large volume also went to direct real
estate investments.  8
7  Werner's analytical  strategy  is to compare  the explanatory  powers  of two versions  of his capital
flows model, without  and with land loans. In the first  version the aggregate  financial  portfolio  of  Japan
is: W= M + B + F (high  power  money,  domestic  bonds plus net foreign  assets). In the second  version  the
total portfolio  V is redefined  to include  land loans L:  V - M + B + F + L.  L is taken as exogenous  and
influenced  by central  bank supervision.  (See Werner  [1994]).
The spread  of the boom around  the world  was summarized  at public  hearings  by the head of the
real estate department  of Credit Lyonnais:  "We were told that French real estate was not expensive
compared  to British  real estate,  which was cheap compared  to US real estate,  which  was cheap compared
to Japanese  real estate"..."For  the fit  time, in 1989-1990  there were transnational  influences.  Remember
the Japanese investors  coming to Paris and buying blocks of buildinp"..."'The mother of all corporate
headquarters  operations  was the Shell  building. It was a wonderful  operation  for the Paris market you
start renovating a building  and, even before work on it has started,  the entire facility has been sold to
investors.  This operation had a  unquestionable  stimulating impact on  the  entire market"  (Peene
testimony, see Assemblee  Nationale [19941,  pp. 590-1). In the US, it is estimated  that Japanese real
estate investments  during  the period 1985-1993  amounted  to S77  billion,  with one third of this flow goingThe 1985-1994  Global Real Estate Cycle. Page 8
Figure 4: Changes in Property Related Loans and Net Japanese Capital Outflows,  1980-1990
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to Califomia  (See  Economist  July 23, 1994).  T Trophy'  or  papcbot' (hwry lina) investment  by
Japanese  and other tuveszou  had similr impacts  in most of the intcAdonal  cidesThe 1985-1994 Global Real Estate  Cvcle. Page 9
2.5  Steep Domestic Asset Deflation in Japan, 1990-91
The abrupt end of asset price inflation in Japan came in 1990  through the combination  of two
main factors: one domestic,  the other external. In 1990, deflatioaarv  and restructuring  policies were
implemented  by Yasushi  Mieno as neu  Governor  of the Bank of  Japan in order to correct the 'bubble
economy". Liquidity  was cut back - particularly  for real estate loans - and the discount  rate was raised
five times moving  it from 2.5 percent to 6.0 percent by the end of 1990.  These  restrictive credit policies
were already leading to an important  stock market correction,  but the stock market adjustment  became
really massive with the Gulf crisis. Externally,  the August 1990 invasion  of Kuwait and the Gulf War
contributed  to a shift  in expectations  and a sharp fall in the Nikkei index of 36.3 percent in just three
months. See Ueda [1990].
Together with stock prices, Japanese real estate prices have declined sharply since 1990.9
Japanese banks now face an unprecedented  increase in non-performing  loans following five years of
rapid growth in their real estate exposure from 7% to  17% of total loans between 1986 and  1990.
Banking  institutions  have been hit with the double  problem  of falling  real estate  values and the sharp fall
in security  prices. This situation  has forced banks  to drastically  curtail new lending  with the joint effect
of a severe credit crunch  at home with an actual fall in domestic  lending  by city banks by 1% in 1993.
This contraction  of bank lending  together  with the overregulation  of Japanese capital markets is leading
to the migration  of large corporate  borrowers  and financial  services abroad.
At the end of this first global  cycle which it contributed  so much to creating, Japan's economy
carries the dual burden of the decline in consumption  linked to asset deflation and the credit crnmch
linked to the weakened  banldng system's inability  to lend.  Bad loans to all sectors  are significantly
concentrated  in non-bank  financial  institutions  -plus the seven housing loan companies  (usen)  with an
estimated  '6  trillion ( $60  billion) of bad debt- which  together had increased  their loans four-fold  since
1986. A 1991  suvey of the 300  largest  non-bank  financial  institutions  by the Ministry  of Finance  shows
that 63 percent of their loans were secured  by real estate, and 41 percent of total loans were to real estate
and the construction  industry.  Long-term  credit  banks and trust banks were particularly  affected by bad
real estate  loans. 10
9  Comparisons  with transaction data collected  by  private Japanese finns suggest that there a
significant  amount  of deliberate  smoothing  in the real estate  price changes  (Koji  Kakaku)  reported  by the
National Land Agency.  The expressed rational for such price  smoothing  being to reduce market
volatility by  not reporting extreme prices.  During the boom, the magnitude of price  gains was
underreported. During the crash, price declines  have been understated. It is generally  agreed that the
prices reported  by the non-government  Japan Real Estate Institute are closer to market conditions.  (see
Stone and Ziemba [19931,  Natacha Dubach [1991],  Renard  and Bourdier  [1989]. Officially,  the Tokyo
region housing  prices are estimated  to have fallen by more than 40% in nominal terms in less than four
years since September  1990;  land  prices have declined  by at least 50%. [Etudes  Fonci2res,  Sept. 1994].
10  The true extent of the bad loan problem throughout  the Japanese banking system has been
obscured by  the  reporting and restructuring policies followed by  Japanese authorities.  Japanese
regulators use rules that are opaque in comparison  to common  international  accounting  rules.  Some
foreign  analysts estimate  that instead of the reported  Y 13.6  trillion (S 143  billion) the true size of all
types of bank problem  loans  is Y 30.0 trillion  (S315  billion)  or 6 percent  of the loan book, suggesting  that
the bad loan situation  may take five years to clear. (Financial  7imes,  July 28, 1994). Govemor  Mieno's
decision  on December  8, 1994  to close  two  credit unions  with  non-perforning  loans df about Y100  billion
(S I bn) may be marking  a turn toward  greater  transparency  away from the smoothing  over of financial
problems.  (See  Financial  Times,  December  8, 1994,  p.4)The 1985-1994  Global Real Estate Cycle. Page 10
Simultaneously, the sharp 50% decline  of equities through the year 1990  iimnediately  affected
the capital  position  of the banks. Under  the Basle accord, banks are permitted  to count 45 percent of the
unrealized  capital gains on securities  (but not real estate)  as Tier 2 capital. This declin  in Tier 2 capital
induces  Japanese banks  to restrain the growth  of their assets, including  the international  markets. Other
institutions such as  pensions funds and  insurance companies have  also  sharply  curtailed their
intemational  portfolio  investment.  I  I At home, in 1993,  the share of non-housing  building in the Japanese
GNP  had fallen to 4.2 percent,  its lowest  level in 35 years.
2.6 Other  Causes  of Surges  in Capital  Inflows
Clearly, Japan has been the dominant source of international capital during this first global
cycle. Yet, to model national real estate cycles  and determine  key  volatility factors it will be necessary
to sort out the importance  of external versus domestic  causes of surges in capital inflows.  Surges of
capital inflows tend to produce a predictable pattern of macroeconomic effects: an acceleration in
domestic demand  and activity, a deterioration  in the extemal current account,  pressures on the price of
real estate, on financial assets, and on the price of goods..  Schadler et al  [1993] consider four basic
categories  of causes  of inflows:  external developments,  policy changes affecting  the real economy,  credit
policy changes, bandwagon  effects.  Among  the six country cases they analyze, three are particularly
illustrative of different causes of real estate booms: Thailand, Spain, and Mexico.  These three cases
illustrate well the  magnitudes of  the massive capital inflows that  small and medium-size open
economies  can now face.
- Thailand is  a middle-income  developing  country which illustrates well the impact of the Plaza
currency realigment  on South East Asian economies.  The first year of the surge  was 1988, the
amplitude  of the flows was very large, reaching  a level of USD 11.8 bn i.e. 12.6  percent of GNP in
the fourth years.  12
e  Spain's surge of capital inflows started in 1987.  The triggers were a series of concurrent  financial
liberalization,  fiscal, and labor market  reforms designed  to harmonize domestic  policies with those of
the European Union. Owing to the larger size of the Spanish economy,  the inflows were larger in
absolute amount  than in Thailand (USD 14.6  bn at the peak) but represented  a smaller share of GNP
(3.8 percent).  Japanese  investment  did not appear  to play a very significant  role. The real estate boom
in the major markets  of Madrid and Barcelona  followed  the European  pattern. However  the volatility
of the office  price cycle  was more  severe in Madrid  than in any of the other cities tracked  by the JLW
data.  The JLW index for office capital values in Madrid (1980= 100) exploded  from 150 in early
1985  to 927 by the end of 1990. Its fall was even more  brutal as this index was already down to 316
by mid-1993. 13
*  Mexico represents  a different  case again.  Accelerated  inflows  started in 1989.  They were affected by
Japanese  manufacturing  investments  but they were essentially  motivated  by the far reaching  opening
of the economy, trade liberalization,  tax reforms, deregulation  and privatization.  These Mexican
domestic  structural  reforms  were leading up to the start of the NAFTA  treaty negotiations  of 1990. In
In 1987,  Japanese  financial  institutions  bought US S137  bn of long-term  securities. During the
first half of 1994,  that figure is down to a net amount of S8  bn. (Financial  7imes, 22-23  October 1994).
12  Data on real estate volatility in SeouL  Korea and Taipei, Taiwan also show a relative peak in
real estate prices in 1988. In these two cases, however,  domestic  policy factors should  also be taken into
account as they played a very significant  role. See Renaud. [1993]),  Chang  et al. [1994].
13  See  "The Non-Residential  Real Estate Market"  Argentwma  Real Estate, Issue  7, Oct.1994,  31-4.The 1985-1994  Global Real Estate Cycle. Page II
the peak year of 1993,  inflows were very large: USD 24.7 bn representing  7.6 percent of GNP. No
data on real estate  prices were obtained  on Mexico  in this review.
Figure 5. Surges of Capital Inflows  into Mexico, Spain and Thailand
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Other cases of recent real estate booms like Colombia  (1990-93)  are coincidental  to the global boom but
have distinct causes. Like  in many other cases,  the surge of capital inflows  into Colombia  was associated
with the opening of the economy 1990 and major domestic  financial reforms starting the same year.
However, Colombian authorities are much less concemed in such one-time adjustments  than with
permanent large capital inflows of the "Dutch Disease" variety caused by the opening of the large
Cusiana oil fields and the attendant  increase  in permanent  income and wealth. The new real estate  price
boom has been much sharper  than any  previous  local cycle in the post W.W.Il  period. [Renaud,  1994].
III. DOMESTIC  FACTORS  AFFECTING  REAL ESTATE  VOLATILITY
Differentiating the quantitative effects of international factors from domestic ones in  the
synchronous  national real estate cycles  which  we observe  in this first  global  real estate cycle could prove
difficult. The explosive  phase of international  capital exports  by Japan coincides  in individual  countries
with major episode  of capital market liberalization,  financial deregulation,  occasional  macroeconomic
enmrs  induced  by the stock market  crash of October 1987,  as well as instances  of significant  deregulation
of the real estate market  Synchronism  in office  real estate  cycles  across  coumtries  may have been fed byThe 1985-1994  Global Real Estate Cycle. Page 12
increases in the local demand for space for financial services, real estate, and other business services
associated  with the rapid expansion  of financial  services  induced  by financial  deregulation.
The coincidence  of national booms was certainly  fed by cross-country  real estate investment  by
banks, pension funds and insurance companies  in search of better portfolio diversification,  and higher
returns. For instance,  it is estimated  that foreign investors  - particularly  Japanese and Swedish  - made
FF 12  billion (US 2 bn) of commnitments  in Paris in 1989;  a figure which  had dropped  precipitously  to FF
2 billion (S 0.35bn)by  1992.14  [Taffin, 19941.  Inthe UK, in 1993, "Britishbankshold only 57%ofreal
estate loans, the remaining  43% are held by foreign  banks, of which 12% are Japanese" (C. Johnson  in
Rev.Econ.Fin.  [1994]).
A  systematic cross-country  tabulation of every significant domestic factor identified in the
countries surveyed is beyond the scope of this paper. The required details are more relevant to the
modeling of  each country, and individual  market cycle. However, there are major recurring themes.
First,  in  most countries bank  deregulation,  fiscal policy, and tax policies have usually all been
procyclical. Second, this real estate boom could not have taken place if  financial institutions had not
been lending so aggressively.  Third, not all financial  institutions were equally involved in real estate
lending  and risky  banking. Finally,  the competitive  pressures  6n land supply generated  by the boom have
occasionally  induced  ill-timed pm-cyclical  local deregulation.
3.1  Capital Markets Liberalization and  Financial Deregulation
Structural  and technological  shifts,  international  competition,  the US experience,  as well as the European
Union  target of the 1992  single market  have stimulated  financial  deregulation  of several kinds:
capital market liberalization:
- removal  of exchange  rate controls
- removal  of restrictions  on the establishment  of foreign  institutions
financial  deregulation:
- abolition  of interest-rate  controls,  or cartels  that fLxed  these rates
- abolition  of direct controls  on credit expansion
- removal  of regulation  segmenting  financial  markets
- development  and improvement  of money,  bond, and equity  markets
-deregulation  of fees and commissions  in financial  services
lagging bank regulation and supervision:
- shift  from (quantitative)  structural  to (risk-based)  prudential  regulation  of financial  institutions
-tightening  and inte.national  harmonization  of prudential  supervision
These major  structural  changes  in OECD  financial  systems  have resulted from a combination  of
market-driven  and  policy-deteranined  reforms. There  is a very direct correlation  between  the intensity  of
national real estate asset cycles, the speed and scope of financial  liberalization  and deregulation,  and the
extent of direct controls at the onset of liberalization. Scandinavian  countries (Finland, Norway and
Sweden)  have had some of the most volatile real estate  markets. They were previously among  the most
tightlv regulated  financial  systems,  and they moved through  deregulati  rn within the span of  a few years.
Not all Nordic countries suffered  from extreme volatility.  Denmark experienced  a milder cycle with its
distinctive financial system, its housing finance directly linked to  capital markets, and conservative
14  It is appropriate  to report financial  flows in terms of domestic  currency  when considering each
national cycle, especially  given the role played  by the Plaza accord.  For instance,  in this case of the Paris
real estate cycle, the Franc appreciated  from FF 7.56 per dollar  at the end of 1985  start  of the boom to
FF 5.12 in 1990  start of the bust. Tlis is an appreciation  of 47/h.The 1985-1994  Global Real Estate Cycle. Page 13
Figure 6:  Domestic  and Foreign Financial Market Liberalization in Finland, 1980-1992
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underwriting  for residential  and business  real estate loans (see for instance Diamond  and Lea [19921).  Its
monetary  policies linked  to the ERM was also a positive  contributing  factor. The UK abolished direct and
indirect  restrictions  on credit and encouraged  direct competition  between  building  societies  and banks. In
addition, London as a major fmnancial  center saw its finance and business employment  expand  sharply
with  both the deregulation  of its stock markets in 1986  (the "big bang") as well as the globalization  of
capital markets.  France also deregulated its financial system with the new Banking Law of 1994.  In
great contrast, Germany did not significantlv deregulate its financial structure.  Its mortgage banks
continued  to operate under the same  underwriting  rules. 15 Neither did it experienced  a major asset price
inflation.
The US  market  has not been a bystander in this frst  global real estate cycle.  However, what
distinguishes  the US experience  from that of other countries is that it was the first funancial  system to
deregulate  in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  The US real estate economy experienced  a first volatile
cycle in the early 1980s.  The massive S&L debacle which ensued had effects which are still being
worked out to this day by the RTC (Resolution  Trust Corporation).  This US cycle in the early 1980s is
proof enough that domestic  factors can play the major role in a real estate.  At that time, the US real
markets were still insulated  from the international  economy and analysts of the real estate economy
could treat  the US capital mz.-kets  as closed. Regional  real estate cycles  were synchronized.
Underlying  the 1985 Plaza cumency  realignment,  by 1986 the US international  capital position
had shifted from net creditor to net debtor for the first time in seventy  years.  This new capital situation
has transformed  the US into another open economy  sensitive  to external  influences. Given the very large
size of the US economy, international  capital flows have had a differentiated impact on regional real
estate economies.  As a result, during the first global real estate cycle, US regional cycles became
asynchronous.  California  and the Northeast were prime targets for foreign investors,  particularly the
Japanese,  and these two region's cycles  moved  in harmony  with the global  cycle.
The US experience remains central to  the new international real estate  environment. The
fimdamental  US changes  in frnance  and investment  that took place in the 1970s  and 1980s  have ushered
into the worldwide  reforms of  national economy and financial markets. 16  US financial liberalization
has played a  central role in influencing the domestic financial deregulation  policies of most OECD
countries. Yet the core lessons  of the US S&L crisis  were ignored  abroad and seen as a purely domestic
issue without systemic interest elsewhere. Monetary  authorities,  bank supervisors,  financial managers,
and industry  people continued  to behave as if their national real estate economy was still a local, non-
traded sector,  where foreign  factors were of limited significance.
German lending for real estate is predominantly  funded through the long-established  mortgage
bond or Pfandbrief  To insure safety and domestic  as well as internautional  marketability,  the Pfandbrief
is regulated by the Mortgage  Banking Law. It is backed by mortgage  loans of  no more than 60% loan-
to-value ratio with property value "conservatively  appraised". Second mortgage  loans such as bauspar
are usual for residential  loans.  Being based on contract savings, these second mortgages  are extremely
safe for lenders,  (see Lea and Renaud [19941). Failure to require adequate investor equity contributions
during the property boom is the prime cause of today's very large non-performing  loan portfolios
everywhere.
16  Some of the landmark US tax and deregulation  events  have been:  the 'May Day" lifting of
fixed commission rates on stock exchanges on May 1, 1975; the Tax Reform Act  of  1976;  the
Depositorv Institutions  Deregulation  and Monetary Control Act of  1980; the Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility  Act of 1982;  the Economic  Recovery  Tax Act of 1984;  the Tax Reform  Act of 1986.The 1985-1994 Global  Real Estate  Cycle. Page  15
3.2 Fiscal Policies and Distorted Incentive Structures
In most OECD countries, the effects of the rapid expansion  of credit which followed the
relaxation of lending constraints  under financial deregulation  have been accentuated  by tax provisions
which have encouraged  indebtedness. Financial authorities typically  failed to appreciate the potential
full effects of pre-existing tax regulations under a  liberalized regime, because these effects were
previously  blunted when restrictive credit controls were in place.  These effects were also different  for
residential  and conunercial  properties.
Policy-makers  can usually be faulted for their inability to  coordinate financial with fiscal
reforms.  For instance, in Britain, income and local taxation favored real estate investment.(see  Hills
[1991]). In Sweden,  the real estate boom appears  to have been amplified  by the announcement  effect of
the removal of the large tax benefits  previously  given to home buyers.[Jaffee,  19941. The United States
experienced see-saw  effects with first  the highly stimulative  impact of the 1981 ERTA on real estate,
followed  by the dampening  of the tax-neutral  1986  TRA  tax reforms,  as is well-known.
In modeling  the global cycle, comparable  user-cost  of capital series may prove difficult, or at
least laborious  to build.  An alternative  variable for cross-country  modeling  of the global cycle is the
inflation-adjusted  , after-tax  cost of borrowing. Graphical  cross-country  comparisons  of the time pattern
of  real after tax cost of borrowing  already indicate the extent to which pre-existing  tax regimes  has
tended to aniplify  the effect of financial  liberalization  on real estate  volatility.  (BIS [1993],  p. 165).  17
3.3 New Macroeconomic Policy Tools, Policy Errors, and a Puzzle
'Te  task of monetary  authorities  was rendered  more difficult during  the 1980s  by the changing
financial  structure. Interest  rates were replacing quantitative  rationing  as the mechanism  regulating  the
supply of credit.  Especially  durng the early stages of liberalization,  traditional monetary aggregates
gave less reliable signals  of the tightness  of credit,  and so did interest rates.  Surges  in credit were also
perceived as just traLsient consequences  of deregulation. In the new environment  of exchange  rates
deregulation,  monetary  authorities  were reluctant  to tighten credit and see an appreciating  exchange  rate
for their economy. Such  factors seem  to explain some  of the diffcrences  between  the sharp asset inflation
of the Nordic  countries  comnpared  to EEC countries  adhering  closely  to the discipline  of the ERM.
In the UK, a major  policy error directly  linked  to the real estate sector was the failure to take
into account appreciating  real estate  assets in the hand of households after the 1987 stock market crash.
(Muellbauer [1992].  Fearing the contraction  effects of stock market wealth losses on consumption,
monetary  authorities  considerably  eased credit,  thereby  fueling  the on-going  real estate boom.
An interesting  puzzle  is how a sharp  asset price boom of the period 1986-1990  could coincide  in
most countries  with price stability  in consumers  goods,  and positive  real interest rates higher than in the
early 1980's, and certainly higher than the negative real rates of the 1970's. Wemner  [19931  provides an
17  Usually, computation  of real rates of interest adjust nominal rates by the CPI. To analyze
investment  behavior  in a given segment  of the real estate market, a better approximation  of the trme  user
cost of capital may be the difference  between nominal  rates and the rate of price appreciation  in that
particular  market segment  See for instance  Jaffee [1994]. This second  measure  better reflects the cost
of holding  a property,  and its year to year changes.The 1985-1994  Global Real Estate Cycle. Page 16
analysis for Japan that can probably be extended  to other countries  like the UK.  In Japan, monetary
expansion  did not depress the yen, did not drive the current account into deficit and greatly reduced
capital outflows, nor did it send the overall price level soaring.  This analysis complements  his other
paper on why observed  capital outflows  of long-term capital greatly  exceeded  the current  account surplus
during  the period 1985-90. The approach is to disaggregate  money into two components:  credit-money
used for "real transactions"  i.e. investment  in pmductive activities or consumption,  and credit-money
used for asset transactions  and speculative  purposes.  This two-part model proves very successful in
explaining the low inflation in the price of goods and services and the sharp inflation in the price of
assets. Implicitly, these findings  point at inadequate or inapproprate monetary regulation and bank
supervision  during  the period.  This analysis could account  for the UK experience,  and also probably that
of Finland and other countries. As discussed  further on, the monitoring  of asset price inflation has now
become an explicit part of moxletary  policy in the UK and Nordic countries.  (See Spolander  [1994] and
KoskenkylA  [19941  ).
3.4 Real  Estate  Contracts  and  Development  Control  Systems
Office rental contracts
The impact  of office rental contracts  on upward  price volatility because of their stmcture and
length is an unsettled question.  Following the last and very sharp London cycle, the issue has been
raised explicitly by the Bank of England which  has suggested a fundamnental  reforns  of present UK
contracts.  In the UK office  rental contracts  are usually  very long and up to 25 years. They contain ratchet
clauses according to which nominal rents can only be adjusted upward.  It is argued in the UK that
prevailing  rental contracts  give conmmercial  property a split personality  as a fuiancial asset: when rents
are rising, property behaves like equity  as rising rental values drive capital values higher. Thanks to the
practice of long-term  leases with  upward  only  rent reviews,  when  rents are falling  property behaves much
more like bonds.  When property yields fall in line with bonds, property values will rise even though
rents are falling. In case of falling  rents,  the mnain  mechanism  for rent adjustment  toward market  levels is
through  tenant relocation  but such moves  involve  significant  transaction  costs.
Jurisdictional fragmentation and competitive local deregulation
Does jurisdictional fragmentation  significantly encourage office investment  volatility through
competitive behavior on the part of local juriscictions?  In some markets, the volatility already
encouraged  by procyclical policies and financial deregulation  has been accentuated by specific supply
side factors.  For instance, development  permits within the Paris region were deregulated to allow
"speculative" office development  in the US sense of a developer initiating a project prior to having
signed up tenants. Developers  of speculative  offices  projects  (bureaux  en blancs)  were required since
1960  to obtain central  administration  clearance,  in addition  to the usual local permits.1 8 Such clearances
were eliminated  in 1985  for several conrergent  reasons. First, with the general political devolution  and
legal decentralization  of government  including urban planning implemented  by the law of 1982 local
governments  had their choices.  At the Paris  region level, deregulation  was a response  to the demand for
is  Originally, a development  permit was required for speculative  office projects over 500m2. In
1972  the limit was raised to 1,000m2. Developmert controls  were reintroduced  in January 1990  for the
western parts of the Paris market to help areas most severely  affected by the office glut, as well as to
limit excessive  office concentration. In 1994, regulations  targeted at very large office employers  and
designed to encourage employment  decentralizatiopi  away from the Paris region  were suspended  to
stabilize  the Paris office marketThe 1985-1994 Global Real Estate  Cycle. Page  17
more office space.  Expectations  were also fed by  the prospect of the 1992 single market, and the
European  competition  for the position  of leading  business  and financial  center.  19
IV. VOLATILITY  IN INDIVIDUAL  MARKET  COMPONENTS
The massive Japanese  land and equity  asset inflation  has triggered  extensive  discussions  of the
existence of a land bubble.  Such discussions  of the existence or non-existence  of  a "bubble" usually
involve an element  of definitional  arbitrariness  because  of the implication of irrationality  which  bubbles
carry. 20 (Stiglitz [1990],  Flood and Hodrick [1990],  Flood and Garber [19941).  For the improvement  of
sectoral  policies and institutions,  it is the issue of economic  inefficiency  of real estate markets  which is
the central  problem. Economic  inefficiency  is reflected  in volatile prices and investment  rates; it relates
to the leads and lags of real estate investment  behavior  compared  to current  market  conditions.  (Case and
Shiller [1988],[1989],  [1990],  Muellbauer  [1994]).
Residential  and non-residential  markets have performed quite differently in terms of rents,
capital values, and investment  rates.  The inefficiency  of property markets  across the main sub-sectors
(offices;  manufacturing  and warehousing;  retailing; hotel, leisure and recreation) has been in evidence
in every country. Short-term  and long-term  returns  across sectors  have varied considerably.  The global
cycle has also exposed  the inadequate  to poor quality of the monitoring  of the various components  of the
real estate markets.  Most countries are as not well monitored as the UK  in terms of tracldng rents,
vacancy rates, and returns. 21 In the UK,  the office sector has been the most volatile among the three
main real estate segments  of office, retail, and industrial  property. The industrial  property  markets have
been the least volatile, industrial development shows greater responsiveness  to demand.  With the
evidence  available,  the following  regularities  can be reported  for thbis  first global  cycle:
19  At the beginning  of the cycle, in 1985,  the total office floor space of the Paris region (Ile de
France) was 29 million  of m2. Between  1986  and 1991 construction  of 12 more  million of squre meters
was started, that is a 40% increase.  Some ddpartements  (comparable  to counties) experienced a 90%
increase in investment during the boom, such as Hauts de Seine, (Taffin [1994]). The JLW index of
office capital values (1980=100)  zoomed  from 140 at the beginning  of 1985 to 450 by the end of 1990.
Correspondingly,  the increase in office building  permits within the Paris region was explosive: 1985:
1.285  million  m2; 1986: 1.762  million  m2; 1987:  2.289  million m2; 1988:  2.763 million  m2; 1989:  2.564
million m2. On the basis of 20 m2 per office worker the implied growth in service employment  was
110,000  to 140,000  new  jobs per year just in the region (Philippe  Saint-Marc  [1994]).  The London data
also shows  a similar  pattenL
20  As Stone and Ziemba  ([1993]  point out, "On one hand, it would  seem something  of an artificial
distinction  to say that movements  in interest rates are a fundamental  factor, but the cyde  of leverage
these movements  unleash are a speculative  bubble.  On the other hand, if the simple definition of a
bubble is when investors  are buying  and selling on the basis that prices will rise further,  then surly  using
the high price of previously  purchased  assets as collateral  for loans to buy still more should qualify as a
bubble".
21  The IPD (Investment  Property Databank) currently holds records of over 14,000 individual
properties with a combined  value of £ 42 billion, which is estimated to represent  approximately  three
fourth of institutional property holdings (see Nabaro,  in  Cross and Whitehead eds. [19941).  By
comparison,  the Jones-Lang-Wooton  Intemational  office property data  is quite infornative, but its
coverage  is limited to "prime  quality  office space of over 500 square  meters in the primary  office market
of each of the [14] cities covered." Underlying  the prevalent market segmentation,  retail and industry
markets  are not covered.The 1985-1994  Global Real Estate Cycle. Page 18
*  Across  national residential  markets, three tiers of volatility seem  to have been experienced.  First, in
the most volatile group  one finds Australia,  the UK and Finland, with Finland  the worst case.  In the
second group of still strong to average volatility one finds Canada, Norway, Sweden, Fiance and
Japan. In the third category  of countries  one finds Germany  and Denmark  where  the residential  sector
was clearly not in phase with the global cycle, nor was volatility significant. The mild German
housing  price boom starts in 1989  with  reunification,  and so does the office  price boom in Berlin.
Figure 7:  Housing Price Boom  in Selected OECD Countries
Housing  Price Boom:  Continental  Europe,  Japan
(rnpminalresidentrealestatepricess  1980-100)
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*  Comparative  data on volatility differences  between  the multi-unit  residential sector and the detached
housing sector was not obtained. In Sweden,  Jaffee [1994]  shows  that the multi-unit sector was less
volatile. But in that segment  of that country  , the state sector plays a very important  role in the three
strategic areas of financing  mechanisms,  access  to land, and construction.
*  The office property market was the real estate segment which experienced  the greatest real estate
price  and  investment volatility.  National office cycles appear to  have  also  been  the  most
synchronous.  Next comes the residential  market. Among  the office markets  the most volatile by  a
wide margin appears  to have  been Spain,  but it is not possible  to ascertain  whether the data available
suffers  from a particular  sample  bias in this case.
*  National and/or local land use and development  regulations  appear to have played a significant  role.
The office market exhibit considerably  more price volatility  than other real estate segments. The
data suggest that investment  volatility while usually substantial  remained less than price volatility.
Markets in capital cities  and  other major centers have been more volatle than regional centers. A
diffusion  process has  been at work  and regional  booms  tend to lag being the capital  markets.The 1985-1994 Global Real Estate  Cycle. Page  19
Housing  Price  Boom:  AngloSaxon  Countries
(nomonal  refdental  real  state  pries  19iO8-100)
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Figure 8: Residential Cobweb  Cycle  in Paris During the Global Boom
|1986-1993  REAL  ESTATE  CYCLE  In  PARIS  I
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Figure 9: Differences  in Capital and Regional Ofce  Cycles: Case of France
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*  Finance has been the driving force during the global cycle by inducing rapid shifts in effective
demand.  The supply response  has been strongly affected by the extent and rigidity of land and
development  controls. Urbanized  land  being the most inelastic  input is expected  to show the greatest
degree of volatility. An hypothesis that could not be  explored is that land price  volatility was
particularly  great in countries where  pre-liberalization  controls were the most rigid.  This point has
been extensively  debated  in the UK; and, as Figure 10 shows, its price volatility was very high and
leading  residential  prices in terms of timing. Higher  land supply  inelasticity  could  also be the case for
Finland  compared  to Norway. It must be noted that Germany  which did not significantly  deregulate
its financial sector also relies on strict land use controls. (Seele 11982],  Bulwien 11994]).  The
Netherlands  also have some of the most systematic  public  land use controls anywhere.  In that coimntry,
administered  land  prices are very uniform.  (Needham  [1992]). Dutch real estate  volatility may have
been low and  paralleled  the German  experience,  no data were obtained  on that country.
Figure 10: High Volatility of Land Prices in the U.K.
Unlbd  Kingdom:  Residential  Building  Land  and Housa  Pi1e Indexes
(1980  * 100)
t1000
go4-00  ---  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -_--  - --  --  --  --  - - - --  - --  - --  - - - -~ - - - - - - -
300 --  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -7-  -
200 --  - - - - - - - - - - - - - _,  -;  ~  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ 
100
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1968  1969  1990  1991  1902
|  -Land Priessindox _4Hlou*P;;s  IndWx 
Source: Savills, Financial Times, 1993.The 1985-1994  Global Real Estate Cycle. Page 22
V. THE 1990  CRASH, ITS IMPACTS  AND ITS HANDLING
"All  happy families are the same, each unhappy  family  is unhappy  in its own  way."
(Lev N.Tolstoy,  Anna Karenina).
The euphoria  that characterized  the real estate sector  for most of the period 1985-1989  vanished
in 1990.  It made way to a precipitops asset deflation which started in 1990 under a  combination  of
external  and internal  factors specific  to each country. Every one is now undergoing  its own deflation and
it is not possible to do justice in this overview to the rich body of experience  which each individual
country  case represents.  Yet it is from the different  country  problems  and their resolution that we expect
to gain the most valuable  findings  to adapt policies to the new global envimnment. Innovations  are also
likely to emerge from the constraints  arising from current problems. This section highlights  recurring
issues in the financial  sector,  in the real estate  industry,  and for households.
5.1 Effects  of Financial  Liberalization  on Bank Lending  Behavior
Financial liberalization  has brought to light a wide range of important issues regarding debt,
financial  fragility and systemic  risk. We focus here on three questions:  how financial  liberalization  has
affected bank behavior  and real estate lending; the role played by non-performing  real  estate loan in
bank crises and their resolution; the impact of real estate price deflation  on household  negative equity
and default.
Rapid Expansion of Bank  Lending and Changing Loan Portfolio Composition
Financial  innovation  and deregulation  during the 1980's has been accompanied  by rapid credit
expansion  and a substantial  increase  in bank lending  as a share of GNP  in many countries. Not only did
the relative volume of loans increased, but its composition  changed significantly under the sharply
increasing pressure of competition from non-bank lending institutions.  Pressure on profitability and
declining  net interest margins triggered  a shift in lending away from large corporate  borrowers  toward
medium-size  and small firmns  as well as households. Bank exposure  to the conmmercial  real estate sector
in  particular grew rapidly  during  the boom in most countries,  sometimes  very sharply  in a few  years. 22
There are enough  important sinilarities across country  experiences  to outline the stylized facts
behind bank behavior during  deregulation  and the boom part of the global cycle.  Prior to deregulation,
banks were operating  in cartelized  markets  and subject  to detailed  quantitative  regulations  which  had for
effect to restrict competition  in the financial  sector. While efficiency  was not necessarily  high, margins
were often  high, and profitability  included  an element  of rent.  Internal  cross-subsidies  between  activities
were not uncommon. Bank employment  was often considered  the next most secure after pivil service.
The burden of the regulatory  rents enjoyed  by banks was born by prime borrowers  and depositors,  mostly
the latter. Given  these  rents, the franchise  value of banks  was high
22  For instance, in France, the volume of real estate loans rose at an exceedingly  high  rate
between 1986  and 1990.  Outstanding  loans by French  institutions  only exploded from FF 63.0 billion
by the end of 1988, to FF 105.9 biHlion  by  1989,  to FF 172.7  billion by  1990 (Commission  Bancaire
[1991],  p.  355); 82.2% of these loans were short-term, 13% medium-term,  and 5% long-term. Foreign
investors  were also extremely  active during  that same  period. For Japan,  refer to the discussion  in Part 11
and to Figure 3.The 1985-1994  Global Real Estate Cycle. Page 23
Increasingly Competitive  Bank Lending Under Deregulation
Following  liberalization  and deregulation,  new markets and new institutions  emerged.  Prime
borrowers  found  that they could meet their funding  needs at lower cost on the commercial  paper market
and other parts of domestic  and international  capital markets.  Depositors  seeking higher yields found
more and more alternatives  to bank deposits. Faced with shrinking margins bank searched for better
yields and moved to new categories  of borrowers.  Often they escaped existing  regulations  by booking
loans in new affiliates  with  broad asset powers such as finance companies. Fresh out from their secure
regulated environment,  banks tended to underestimate  the risks they faced with their new  borrowers.
Later entrants following the leads or earlier banks umderpriced  the risk of their loans to marginal
borrowers  and lowered  lending margins  for everyone.  In most countries  one find that solvency  problems
are concentrated  in finance companies,  leasing companies  and specialist  real estate lenders. Latecomer
savings banks and cooperative  banks in Nordic coumtries  are also a large component  of the solvency
crisis. In most countries,  especially  the UK and Canada,  insurance  companies  were also severely  affected
by the real estate crash. 23
Differentiation Between  Large and Small Financial Institutions and Elements of Bad Banking
Lending  errors were frequent There were more or less always the same.  They tended to be
systematically  related  to the type of financial  institutions. Large commercial  banks, specialized  lenders,
and small  banks  tend to take different  types  of risks determined  by the clientele  they serve. The nature of
the risks and returns  changes  with  the type of clientele. Major  banks  finance major  operators,  others take
the rest. In particular,  small  finance companies  and  latecomers  to the real estate markets  have tended to
focus on the trading  of  existing real estate assets which was becoming increasingly  volatile in prices.
For them real estate development  was often  secondary.
There is an important element  of bad banking  during  the real estate boom in every country  for
both real estate and other loans.  Besides fraud cases, in the failures where they intervened, bank
supervisors  found  that basic  principles  of sound  banking  were breached:
*  Lending  was exceedingly  concentrated  in a few  activities,  especially  real estate.
*  Even within the real estate sector, lending has been concentrated  onto a few business groups or
individuals.  24
*  Countexparty  risk has been  ignored. Such risk has been shown  to be twice as great for real estate
loans than for industrial  or business loans. Yet lenders  have usually not charged  a risk premium for
this risk. They  have  been satisfied  with  the buildings  as collateral.
*  Growing  real estate  portfolios  were not monitored.
23  Confederation  Life hisurance  Co. was placed into liquidation  in August 1994. It was Canada's
fourth largest insurance  with C$19 billion assets and  among the most aggressive  property lenders and
developers. Almost  half of its investment  was in commercial  mortgages.  In Canada  also,  the real estate
company Olympia  & York developer of Canary Wharf in London was estimated to carry a total debt
between $10 and $20 billion held by Canadian (Imperial  bank of Commerce),  US (Citicorp),  French
(Credit  Lyonnais),  and UK banks.
24  Probably  the most egregious  and most famous case of bad banking during this first global real
estate cycle took place in Osaka. There, Mrs. Nui Onoue,  a restaurant  owner  who engaged  in real estate
and other investment  activities  succeeded  in borrowing  the enormous  sum of V 240 billion  ( over S2.0
billion at current  rates) from the Industrial  Bank of JapanL The fact that Mrs.  Onoue  was later indicted in
connection  with the issuing of V 340 billion-worth  of forged certificate  of deposits  does not lessen the
case for  knowing one's  countexparty.  Supervisor reports in  every country mention comparable
occutrences,  if on a smaller  scale.The 1985-1994  Global Real Estate Cycle. Page 24
*  Cash  flow was not correctly  analyzed.  Loans could appear to be current because  of the existence  and
use of interest cash  reserves  -ftmded with debt  - hiding cash deficiencies  to cover debt service.
*  Assets  and liabilities  were mismatched.
*  Attention was exclusively  focused  on the short-run  fees and on maintaining  actvity in a market with
excess capacity.  Because  of asset inflation, little concem was shown toward the risk that both the
borrower and the collateral  could be subject to the same  shock. 25
*  Further  real estate  lending took place to assist  large corporate  clients in difficulty  in unloading  some
of their real estate assets.
Bank supervision during this  very  sharp asset price  cycle remained dominated by  pre-
deregulation norms and skills. It tended to perform rather poorly and late. Guidelines were lagging
behind market  trends and did not address  the increased  riskiness  of new lending. In the case of real estate
lending, a  thorough  review of prudential  rules, lending regulations regarding loan underwriting,  and
property  valuation is now in progress  in most coimtries.
Disproportionate  Role  of Real  Estate  in Banking  Problems
Financial  liberalization  has led to poor lending  to many sectors. However,  non-performing  real
estate loans have been at the epicenter  of banking  problems  in every country  since 1990. The banking
crisis in the Nordic  countries,  was particularly  severe and extremely  costly. 26 There, the total cost of
support  to the banking  system  over  the period 1989-1993  as a  percentage  of GDP  has been extremely
high, as follows:  27




US S&L:  3.2%
In comparison,  the net present value of the costs  of the US Savings  and Loans debacle is estimated at
S180 billion which amounts  to 3.2% of the 1992 US GNP.  Finland was most severely affected by the
insolvency of its savings bank system moving from a tightly regulated environment  of lending to the
25  France is a country  were there has not been a  systemic shock  like in the Nordic countries.
Published  information  gives much evidence  that prblems  with non performing  real estate loan portfolios
in  large banks as well as specialist banks were perfectly avoidable.  They result from poor bank
management often amplified by  weak intenal  controls.  The worst institutional  problems have been
concentrated in  finance companies, specialist banks, and  medium size banks.  Most of  the non-
performing loans held by the "large banks" belong to subsidiaries  of Credit Lyonnais. (See Assembl6e
Nationale (19941  ). Other  banks, fully aware of the volatility of the on-going  cycle either diversified  their
risks or refrained  from operating  in the sector  on a significant  scale such as Sociele Generale.  (See Immo
Press [1994] ).
26  Only in Dennark has the required  public support  to banks been modest. It went to a few small
and medium-sized  banks;  see Koskenkyll  [1994].
27  For the full details on the Nordic banking crisis in Finland  Sweden and Norway refer to
KoskenkulA  [1994], Koskenkula  and Vesala [1994], Nyberg and VuihmAl  [1994], Llewellyn [1992],
Finland Govermment  Guarantee  Fund [1994], Goldstein  and Folkerts-Landau,  11993],  and BIS [1993],
[19941.The 1985-1994  Global Real Estate Cycle. Page 25
personal sector into commercial  lending  and foreign currency to the marginal customers  of the banking
system  (Skopbank,  Savings  Bank of Finland). Given  the systemic  nature  of the crisis  in Nordic  countries,
financial authorities have had to resort to a  wide variety of rescue instruments,  regulatory actions,
closures,  and sanctions  which do not need to be detailed.  Loan losses as a percentage of total assets
ranged  between 3% and 4.5% in 1992.  Excess  capacity  in the banking system  is being reduced  steadily,
and so is the number  of bank employees.
The role of real estate and construction  loans in bank problems  has been disproportionately  high.
This can be illustrated  de minimis  by the case of Finland  where the macroeconomic  collapse  also severely
affected the balance-sheets  of  a wide variety of corporations  and the household sector as well. In
Finland,  the relative weight  of real estate can be expected  to smaller than in other countries. As seen in
Table 1, by the end of 1992, real estate loans made up 5.7% of the total banking portfolio.  They
represented 16.4% o non-performing  assets, and 20.5% of all loans and guarantees  write-offs. The two
other main corponents of non-performing  assets are construction  and household loans.  Construction
accounts  for another 11.85  of write-offs  which is not very surprising,  especially  in the Finnish context.
More  remarkable  is the fact that household  loans are the largest component  of non-performing  loans with
a 21.1% share. Due to massive extemal  shocks  and the accelerator  effect of the crash,  GNP fell by 15%
in two years and unemployment  rose to 22% by the end of 1902. Because  household  loans are recourse
loans in Finland  only 6.6%  were written-off.
Table 1: FINLAND: Banking Groups Total Exposure as of 31 Dec 1992.
Sector  Total  %  Non-  %  Write-offs on
exposures  performing  loans and
FM bn  assut  guntees
FM bn  FM bn
Corporate  268  45.1  32  58.9  17  71.8
Manufacturing  89  14.9  4  7.5  2  8.8
Construction  29  5.0  6  10.1  3  11.8
Trade, restaurants,  hotel  58  9.7  7  13.4  3  14.2
Real estate business  34  5.7  9  16.4  5  20.5
Other  58  9.8  6  11.5  4  16.5
Households  192  32.3  12  21.1  1  6.6
Other  domestic 1/  57  9.5  3  6.1  2  10.6
Foreign  78  13.1  8  13.9  2  11.0
All sectors  595  100.0  55  100.0  22  100.0
I/ Includes financial  institutions,  general govemnment  and  non-proftt  intitions.
Source: Banlk  of Finland
Restructuring  Vehides,  Transparency,  and  Asset  Disposition
In addition to bank mergers and closures,  supervisory authorities of many countries have
followed a "good bank-bad bank" approach to solve the solvency problems of  distressed financial
institutions.  They have created  asset management  companies to dispose of  problem  assets in the least
disruptive way  possible.  A  comparative analysis of  the  financial cost,  corporate governance,
transparency and effectiveness  of real estate asset disposal  policies of these different  asset management
will be very important  for future reference. The most sgnificant asset management  companies  for which
data may be accessible  for evaluation  are:The 1985-1994  Global Real Estate Cycle. Page 26
Sweden:  Securum  for Nordbanken
Retriva for Gotabank
Finland:  Arsenal Ltd for the Savings  Bank of Finland
Siltapannki for STS-Bank
Norway:  No asset management  company  were used
US:  Resolution  Trust  Corporation  (RTC)
Japan:  Credit Cooperative Purchasing Corporation (CCPC)
France:  Omnium Immobilier de Gestion (OIG) for Cr6dit Lyonnais28
Some of these asset management companies,  such as the Nordic ones, are expected to be  effective.
Others,  like the Japanese  CCPC, are considered  as interim solutions  which are only helping to dress up
the balance sheets of participating banks.  The CCPC may soon have to be replaced by  a  better
institutional  arrangement  because  the current CCPC  structure  and rules do really not permit a pennanent
disposal  of the problem  real estate  assets.
The problem of asset disposition  for this new cycle has become quite different from early real
estate busts.  The behavior  of pension fimds and insurance companies  has changed and they are not
playing the samne  role in the direct purchase of problem  assets as in earlier cycles.  For instance,  in the
TK  pension  funds had 21% of their assets  in property  in 1981,  but only 8% in 1990.  The securitization
of conunercial real estate assets which has been successfully  developed by the RTC has become an
effective  route for asset disposition  in the US, but the development  of securitization  is not yet advanced
enough  in most other countries  to offer a significant  link to more  diverse investors.
Major  banks with large property  loan  portfolios  are very anxious to not dispose  of their problem
loans too quickly  thereby incurring  more  losses. Some, like Barclays  in the UK which has a portfolio  of
£4.2 billion ($6.3 bn) are issuing derivatives  to offset the risk of further losses and to hedge themselves.
Without  a hedge, Barclays  management  finds that it would  face pressure  to refuse new property loans, or
would  have to sell old ones at an inappropriate  time.
Financial  Accelerator,  Debt-Deflation  and  Credit  Crunch
There has been considerable,  sometimes  passionate  debate in the US about the existence  of a
"credit crnmch" in the region of the US most affected by the real estate crash such as the North-East.
The exact role of regulators  who tightened  their loan evaluation  criteria thereby indirectly  raising capital
requirements  has been questioned. 29 The notion of a credit crunch  and of banks that would refuse to
lend to credit worthy customers  to such an extent that there would  be  a slowdown  in loan growth seems
2x  The OIG known generally as ("structure de cantonnement  d'actifs'") is only designed to handle
FF 42.6 billion ($8 Bn) worth of domestic  problem loans.  Write-uffs for international  loans include
FF2.6 bn for Olympia  & Yor6, and FF 4.25 bn for Fiormi-Sasea.  It is esimated that FF30 to FF40
billion of international  real estate loans of Credit  Lyonnais and its subsidiaries  were not placed into a
specialized  asset management  structure  and remain  on the balance-sheet  of the bank group. (See  Peeme
in Assemblee  Nationale  [1994],  p. 590. The  public cost of the OIG  stucture is capped  at FF14.4  bn.
29  See for instance  Peek and Rosengren's "Crunching  the Recovery",  and Litan's "Banks  and
Real Estate;  Regulating  the Unholy  Alliance" in Browne  and Rosengrca (1994].The 1985-1994  Global Real Estate Cycle. Page 27
to be a marginal  issue at best. From  an international  perspective,  there are three main  factors which  may
explain why the real estate  bust has been even sharper  that the boom in the global  cycle. First, there is
the asymmetric  impact of liquidity constraints  for small and medium firms over the cycle.  Second,  the
severe losses of the banks have temporarily  impaired their ability to lend until they have rebuilt their
capital  base. Third, the shift from the old quantitative  controls  and "window  guidance"  to the Basle risk-
based capital adequacy  ratios happened  to be taking  effect at the time of the crash.
Bernanke,  Gertler  and Gilchrist  [1989],  [19941  have extensively  studied  the financial  accelerator
effects on bank lending throughout cycles  and the impact of weak borrower balance sheets and bank
flight to  quality during business cycle downtuns.  They find considerable differences  between the
behavior of large and small firms over the business cycle.  While large firm do not alter much their
behavior  over  the cycle, there is evidence  of asymmetries  in small-firm  inventory/sales  dynamic over  the
cycle.  Small firms shrink their balance-sheet  during  the cycle, large finms  do not. Large firms obtain
credit directly from the open market, small  firms rely heavily on intermediate  credit.  Small finns are
heavily concentrated  in construction,  retail  and wholesale.  In economies  where the real estate sector is
made up of small firms financed by small financial  institutions  downturns  can therefore  be particularly
sharp.  Calomiris at al [1994] provide similar findings and stress the impact of financial leverage on
asynunetrical firm behavior. Highly  leveraged  firms suffer the most  during bust. High  leverage  is a
very common  feature  of real estate  firms.
In most countries,  the impact of bank losses has been so severe  that the constraining  effect on
banks' ability to lend will be felt for an estimated  three to five years.  There is a concurrence  of weak
ability to borrow and weak ability to lend which  is particularly  marked  in Japan (see earlier discussion).
It has taken several year for the US banking system  to rebuilt its capital thanks to the sharply positive
yield curve  resulting  from the Federal  Reserve policies  between 1990  and 1994. This  rebuilding  of bank
balance-sheet  has been slower in Western  Europe  where interest rates have remained  higher than in the
US for an extended  period of time  due to German  anti-inflation  policies linked  to reunification.
There  are reasons  to believe that  there will not be a repeat of the first global  real estate crash of
the same  magnitude. One of them is that the transition  to risk-based  prudential  supervision  and the Basle
solvency  ratios has formally  been completed  in 1993. While not a perfect panacea against unsafe and
unsound lending, the shift to such prudential  ratios is part of the rapid shift  to more  accurate evaluation
and pricing of risks by lenders. 30 Probably  one of the most difficult problems remains the effective
supervision of banks and bank holdings in the new global environment.3 1 There remain, however,
unresolved  problems  within  the real estate industry  itself.
30  The 1988 Basle Accord among the G-10 sets risk-weighted  capital standards  a floor  total
capitalization  of 8% for Tier 1  plus eligible  Tier 2 capital. Equity capial consist  of perpetual  preferred
stock, common  stock, surplus,  undivided  profits  and capital reserves,  and cumulative  amounts of foreign
currency  reserve translation.  Tier 1 differs  from equity  capital by also including  the minority  interest in
equity accounts of consolidated  subsidiaries. Tier 2 capital includes other types of preferred stock,
subordinated  debt, loan loss reserves  (up to 1.25%  of risk-based  assets),  and mandatory  convertible  debt.
Eligible Tier 2 capital cannot exceed  Tier 1 capital. Broadly  the risk weighting  of assets is as follows:
zero weight is assigned to government  securities cr securities will full government  guaranties;  20%
weight to  interbank securities, including mortgage-backed securities; 50% wdight to  qualifying
conventional mortgages on one- to four-family  homes; 100% weight to most other loans, including
comrnercial  and industrial,  consumer  and commercial  real estate  loans.
3  1  Consider  again the case of Credit  Lyonnais  which has been burdened  with  poor acquisitions  of
industrial assets, in addition to its troubled  real estate portfolio most of it generated by subsidiaries.
Credit Lyonnais has a balance-sheet  of nearly FF 2,000 billion (about  $ 360 billion) with some 550
subsidiaries.  To meet supervision  needs, the French Banking Commission  has a total of 350 staff to
supervise  all French financial  institutions  and  bank holdings.The 1985-1994  Global Real Estate Cycle. Page 28
5.2 Adjustments  in the Real Estate Industry
The Valuation Problem
Real  estate  values,  especially for  non-residential properties,  are  extremely sensitive to
assumptions  made about vacancy rates and rent levels. If the global  real estate crash has publicized  one
thing, it is the poor quality  of information  on real estate markets. From the viewpoint of investors,  there
is a  large credibility gap between property and other assets.  The Mallinson Report  on valuation
published  in the UK in 1994  underlines  the weakness  of real estate forecasting  among  other issues related
to property valuation.  Credible market statistics and analysis  is sorely lacking for fimd managers
compared  to the standards  of information  prevailing  for fixed-income  securities. Property  valuations in
corporate  balance-sheets  are often questionable  and are finally  being questioned. Real estate markets  are
cyclical in  part because they  are inefficient, and  the  current information gap  accentuates this
inefficiency.
Closer Links Between  The Real Estate Industry and  Capital Markets
An unsettled question is whether this first global cycle has led to a permanent change in the
structure of the real estate industry toward greater concentration  into larger firms better able to access
capital markets. There could  be a lasting restructuring  of the real estate  industry  along the line of what is
evolving  in the United States, Le. much closer and direct links between the real estate industry  and the
capital markets.  In the past, commercial  property finance was the preserve of  banks, S&Ls, and
insurance companies. All these institutions  are now withdrawing  from property lending.  Large-scale
developers  are moving  from property  finance  provided  by  private investors to financing  through capital
markets  vehicles. The two main vehicles are REITs  and securitization.  The new REITs,  which have lost
their former  tax break offer an equity investment  in real companies  that often specialize in one type of
property in one region. They offer institutional  investors  a liquid way to hold property.  The correct
value of  better liquidity is not entirely clear but through these REITs investors  have been prepared to
hold property at yields lower than what individual  property buyers demand. The supply of  securitized
commercial  property mortgages is expanding  steadily. In the wake of the RTC securities, an increasing
volume of property loans is coming from banks, insurance  companies,  and a few property developers.
There has even been some high yield securitization  of "junk" property sold to specialist  property funds
and hedge funds looking  for large total returns  under  the expectation  that the worst of the bust is over.
5.3 Households: Price Deflation, Negative Housing Equity and Default
The impact of the global  real estate cycle on the household  sector differs  greatly  according  to the
strength of personal balance-sheets  in every country. High housing  price volatility of global cycle has
often interacted with high and rising levels of indebtedness  for large segments  of  population during  the
1  980s. These interactions  have produced  in turn rising levels of loan delinquency,  defaults and personal
bankruptcies.  A significant  portion of the gross  assets of households  may  be very illiquid  and of little use
during financial distress,  such as pension rights, consumer  durables,  and some forms of property.  The
underwriting  rules for housing  loans followed  in the 1980s  are under often  under question,  or should  be.
Increasing Fragility of Personal Balance-Sheets  During the 1980s
There were considerable  initial differences in the overall level of personal indebtedness  in the
personal sector  across  OECD countries  at the beginning of the 1  980s. There were for instance important
differences  in the level of indebtedness  between  Britain  and Canada  on one hand and France on the other.
As a nule, levels of indebtedness  were originally  lower, personal balance-sheets  stronger and personalThe 1985-1994  Global Real Estate Cycle. Page 29
savings  rate higher in the financial systems  of Continental  Europe and Japan (CEJ countries)  than in
those of Anglo-Saxon  countries  (AS countries). Figure 11 provides  a partial picture  of the debt-carrying
capacity  within the household  sector.  It shows  that there was during the 1980s a general trend toward
rising levels of aggregate personal debt compared to  income. The competitive forces of financial
liberalization  and deregulation  have led to the rapid development  of retail banking and an apparent
decline  in credit rationing. There were rising levels of debt to income  ratios, and to a lesser extent debt
to asset ratios.  Between 1981 and 1990,  personal indebtedness  rose particularly sharply in the US,
Britain  and Japan. Within  the sample,  Italy is very much the  odd man out with a very low level of initial
indebtedness,  and little change  during  the decade.
Figure  11: Household  Debt  as Percent  of Household  Disposable  Income  in Selected  Countries
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Source:  IMF;  Salomon  Brothers;  OECD;  BIS.
In addition to large country  differences  in overall indebtedness,  there are major differences  in
debt, wealth and income across  the population  of the same country. Since 1980,  there has been a  rising
levels of defaults in most countries,  particularly  during  recessions. High rates of default have affected
significant  segments  of the population  in economies  like the  LTK,  Australia, and The Nordic Countries
where volatility  has been extreme and variable rate loans used.  Price deflation and  rising  real interest
rates have accentuated  debtor  problems  in most other countries.  The ability  to rebuilt household  balance-
sheets rapidly has weakened as many OECD countries are experiencing  a  decline in their personal
savings  rate. This is especially  the case in the US where  the personal savings  rate hit a historical  low of
4.3% for the 12-month  period ending  in August 1994.
Debt  deflation  and  Rising  Negative  Equity  in Housing
Tax policies have often induced households  to assume excessive amounts of debt during the
boom. In the Nordic countries  in particular, high marginal income tax rates were coupled with very
generous  tax deduction  making  the real cost of borrowing  for housing  very  low and  typically  negative  forThe 1985-1994  Global Real Estate Cycle. Page 30
most households  until 1989  when interest rates rose. 32 The result has been a sharp increase in median
LTV ratios within a very short  period of time during  the cycle, by some 10% over all outstanding loans
in Sweden.  Lagging expectations  about the eroding impact of inflation on debt which happened in the
1970s  also led to underestimating  the burden of debt in the new environment  of low inflation and high
real interest  rates since 1985.
Housing price deflation has had a disproportionate  impact on first time home buyers and has
produced significant  cohorts of young households  with negative housing equity. The problem has been
particularly  severe in the most volatile markets were actual defaults  have become a serious banking as
well as social problem (for  the UK see Dorling [1994],  Finland see Table I and Kosonen and Timonen
[1994],  and Norway see Nordvik  [1994]). Figure 12 which is derived  from Building  Society Association
data in Dorling shows how rapidly  the group  of households  with  negative equity  in housing expended  in
the UK within a short  period of 15 month. This data covers  people who  bought housing  during  the three-
year 1988-91. A high  percentage  of this group  is technically  insolvent. Anyone  who bought housing at
a loan-to-value  ratio above 85% soon was facing severe negative equity  problems as early as 1992. Of
course,  not all households  with negative equity  will default. many will be able to restore their solvency
over time.  Rising nominal  property  values may reverse the situation  in due course. It is not clear how
long it will take for the housing price level to rise sufficiently in the general environment of debt
deflation.  Meanwhile  this important  young  population  appears  to be severely constrained  in all its major
investment  and consumption  decisions,  including  employment  relocation  if needed.
Figure 12: Sharp Increase  in Recent Buyers With Negative Equity After 1991, UK.
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Clearly,  financial  liberalization  has played a role in stimulating  excessive  lending  practices. If it
is not an indictment of excessive emphasis  on home ownership,  the present UK situation and that of
several other countries  shows  that the goal of home ownership  is not compatible  with high levels of debt
in volatile housing  markets.  33  The young UK population  has been confronted simultaneously  with an
unusual collection  of factors all leading  toward  greater  financial  fragility: the lack of an adequate  private
32  For a comparative  analysis,  see for instance  BIS [1993],  p. 165. Of course,  during the boom
phase the user cost of housing  was even more  favorable  with rapidly  rising housing  prices.
3 3  In addition  to the UK and Nordic  countries,  similar  conditions  led to comparable  outcomes  in
Australia. See Gavin  Jones [19921  and Judith  Yates [1994].The 1985-1994  Global Real Estate Cycle. Page 31
rental market  which  puts pressure  on them to move into ownership  very early in the liife  cycle, a highly
volatile real estate market, a low and declining  personal savings rate, very high LTV ratios, and loans
canying variable interest rates that are not easy to stabilize in an open economy. The full lessons for
other countries  of the convergence  of these factors in the UK deserves more systematic review since
financial  liberalization  seems  to favor such trends  elsewhere.
Appropriate Levels of Consumer Protection
Taking as given that underwriting  rules to qualify borrowers  can be improved,  what should be
the  appropriate levels of consumer protection in  case of delinquency and default?  How should
contractual  risks be shared  between lenier, borrower,  and the state? Asset deflation  has thrown light on
different  approaches.  First, mortgage  loans can be made by banks with total recourse as is the case in
the Nordic countries. In such a case, the full cost of a default is carried  by the borrower. With the
systemic  banking crisis they have undergone,  Nordic countries  are facing serious social problems with
insolvent  households  whose future is gravely impaired. Alternatively,  consumer  protection  may permit
public authorities  to participate  in the renegotiation  of loans in the case of overindebted  households  with
the implication  that part of the resolution  cost will be bome by the leLder. In France where personal
bankruptcy  laws are also severe the Scrivener  Law on Consumer  Protection creates such a process.
Financial institutions  have argued that the process creates  uncertainty,  raises costs and generates  moral
hazard. In the UK the cost  of traditional  unemployment  insurance  which protects  a mortgage  holder for
two years has been questioned. The US personal  bankruptcy  laws are often considered  unnecessarily  lax
and open to misuse. What should be the appropriate  bankruptcy  laws in a liberalized financial system
deserves  a closer  look.
CONCLUSION
"An increase  in the ratio of Ponzi  finance,  so that it is no longer a rare event,  is an indicator  that the
fragility  of the financial  structure  is in a danger  zone for debt-deflation" 34
(Hyman P. Minsky, Stabilizing an Unstable Economy, 1986)
An implicit question underlying  this paper is whether the very sharp volatility in real estate
prices and other assets during this first global cycle might become a recurrent  feature of global capital
markets.  How can we avoid another  wave of Ponzi  finance?  Was  this first global  cycle merely  the high
cost of adjustment  to a  new economic  and financial eavironment  mnirked  by international  financial
liberalization  and domestic  deregulation? The composite  evidence  assembled  only suggests  that another
global cycle of the amplitude  of the 1985-94  cycle with its attending  large economic costs is probably
preventable.  What we have is a rich research  agenda for the design of  policies and/or institutional
arrangements  that can reduce volatility in the real estate sector.  The policy and research agenda is
directly  applicable  to many middle-income  and newly  industrialized  economies  that are opening up to the
global  financial  markets. Significant  areas can  be listed  briefly:
Macroeconomic  policies to control surges  of capital inflows  while critical  fall beyond  the direct scope
of this paper.  On the other hand, monetary  policy in some of the OECD countries (UK, Nordic
countries)  which  suffered  the greatest  volatility  now takes explicitly  into consideration  the effects of
34  "...Ponzi  finance is evocative  of fraud; the reference  is usually  to a scheme  that fulfills promises
of extravagant  returns  to investors  who enter  the scheme early  by using the principal of funds commited
by those who enter  the scheme  at a later  date. However,  Ponzi  finance, simply  defined  as the payment of
cash to debt holders with funds raised by either additional  debt or decreasing cash kickers, is not an
unusual  event - and it is not necessarily  fraudulent.  " [Minsky,  p.340].The 1985-1994  Global Real Estate Cycle. Page 32
asset price volatility. Other countries do not. Considerable  research may be needed to identify and
quantify  the links  between credit expansion  and asset price  volatility.
Careless lending by financial institutions  has played a critical role in the global cycle.  Presently,
banking regulation  and supervision  continues  to adapt  to the changing  financial  market  structure. Four
areas have been shown deficient and are undergoing significant changes while the banking sector
works itself from under its non-performing  loans: (1) risk-based  prudential  rules regarding  portfolio
diversification,  (2) underwriting  rules regarding equity capital and counterparty  risk in each lending
operation, (3) the need for periodic and frequent property valuation. (4) Market intelligence and
monitoring  also remains a very weak area in many, if not most markets  from a lenders  point of view.
The last two items are important  yet typically  underdeveloped  areas for real estate research in most
countries.
*  Regarding  the resolution of banking problems, early and informal evidence suggests that banks in
countries  following  more transparent  approaches  wifl recover  better. (5) Since banking  problems will
continue to occur a  comparative  evaluation  of restructuring  vehicles and policies toward efficient
asset disposition  will be very useful.  (6) Property  loan securitization  as a means of managing risk is
one of the innovations  which  is making  progress  during  the crisis.
*  The real estate industry  has been undergoing  major changes which are still evolving, and it is not
always easy to differentiate  what is cyclical  what is structural in new forms of financing. (7) In an
environment  of asset deflation,  lending  has become quite different.  Developers  have lost the ability to
appropriate  much of the value of their projects. The financing  of projects has shifted toward  better
risk sharing and much less leveraged financing. (8) There is a differentiation  between the largest
developers  who are developing  new forms of funding  on the capital markets,  and others  who continue
to rely on the banking sector.  Large project and multi-family  housing developers  are much more
dependent on public markets.  (9) Investors relations have durably changed.  On the other hand,
improving  the financial and economic  efficiency of real estate markets through better information
remains an open question. See also (3) and (4) above.
*  The ability of households  - first-time  buyers in particular - to carry debt in increasingly  volatile
interest rate environments  has probably  been reduced and needs to be better monitored.  The rules of
sound underwriting  are well known, and the causes of mortgage default and foreclosure are well
understood.  (10) Countries  where policies push toward very high housing loan-to-value  ratios of
90% or more seem to  be asking for more default problems in  the global environment.  (11)
Acknowledging  the important institutional differences across countries, can we identify the  key
features of housing finance systems that should be developed to achieve greater stability in open
economies? For instance,  the economies  where  households  carry a high  level of debt most of which is
at variable rates are very sensitive  to short-term  rates adjustment.  Such  economies  could  become more
difficult to manage in the new global  environment:  boom-bust  cycles could be exacerbated  as short-
term interest  rates cut are politically  popular. To correct  such  tendencies,  access to capital markets  for
funding and the development  of mortgage  bonds markets will make increasing  volume of fixed-rate
loans possible,  contributing  to less  volatility.The 1985-1994 Global Real  Estate  Cycle. Page 33
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